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Abstract Invasions biologists have frequently
debated whether the definition of invasive should
include ecological and economic impacts. More recent
criticisms posit that objective definitions are impossible
in any absolute sense, while subjectivity is desirable for
its flexibility and motivational qualities. We argue that
such criticisms underestimate the extent of subjectivity
already present in invasion biology. Ecological ques-
tions may be methodological if they relate directly to
other ecological theories and models, or motivational if
they focus on issues important to society as a whole.
Motivational questions are important for engaging
scientists, improving public understanding of science,
and often have applied benefits. In contrast, methodo-
logical questions are constrained by established
scientific theories, and are therefore more efficient for
the development of scientific knowledge. Contrary to
recent critiques, we suggest that greater objectivity is
both achievable and desirable for the discipline of
invasion biology and ecology generally.
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Terminology can have a profound influence on scien-
tific thought and discovery. This is why international
standards are common among professional science
organizations, and science textbooks regularly include
glossaries of common terms. Scientists occasionally
attempt to clarify terminology in their discipline and
this is particularly true for invasion biology, where
definitions of invasive, naturalized or alien have been
debated frequently (e.g. Davis and Thompson 2000;
Richardson et al. 2000, 2008; Daehler 2001; Rejmánek
et al. 2002; Colautti and MacIsaac 2004; Pyšek et al.
2004; Colautti 2005; Warren 2007; Valéry et al. in
press). But attempts to clarify or unify ecological
terminology have been criticized recently, mainly over
concerns about the inevitability of subjectivity in
scientific research, the impossibility of a formalized
scientific method or lexicon, and the importance of
flexible terminology for communicating scientific
issues (e.g. Larson 2007; Hodges 2008).
Issues involving terminology may benefit from the
input of researchers, like Larson (2007) and Hodges
(2008), who are well-versed in the philosophies of
science, language, and policy. The positive role of
subjectivity and flexible terminology in science gen-
erally has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Kuhn 1962;
Feyerabend 1993), while its negative effects are
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evident in public controversies surrounding the science
of climate change or the merits of intelligent design
(e.g. Bykoff 2008; Forrest and Gross 2004). However,
we are concerned that our arguments for more objec-
tivity in invasion terminology have been misrepre-
sented as an extreme form of logical empiricism and
used as a straw-man to critique a constrictive view of
scientific communication. Using examples from inva-
sion biology, we argue that the views expressed by
Larson (2007); Hodges (2008) underestimate the level,
and confuse the type of subjectivity that currently
underpins several ecological terms and concepts, much
to the detriment of the field. Notwithstanding the
potential importance of some level of subjectivity for
science in general, we here try to clarify our argument
for the merits of greater objectivity and consensus in
terminology associated with biological invasions and
why we believe it will improve the science of invasion
biology. Although we have focused our critique on the
study of biological invasions, parallels can easily be
drawn to other attempts to formalize ecological
concepts (e.g. biodiversity, ecosystem, ecosystem
engineer, habitat, keystone).
The criticisms presented by Hodges (2008) are
aimed at attempts to unify terminology in ecological
research generally, focusing on the importance of
flexibility—a useful form of subjectivity—in concepts
and definitions. Specifically, Hodges (2008) argues
that (i) flexible terminology stimulates the generation
of knowledge, and (ii) clarifying and standardizing
ecological terminology impedes research by closing
areas of inquiry. Larson (2007) is more specific in
criticizing the terminology proposed by Colautti and
MacIsaac (2004; hereafter C&M), as follows. First,
attempts to standardize terminology assume a false
dichotomy between facts and values, and are thereby
flawed because no science can be objective in an
absolute sense. Second, C&M fail to acknowledge that
facts cannot be independent of human perception.
Since subjectivity is inevitable in science, the C&M
model cannot be considered objective. Finally, the
C&M model ignores the importance of subjectivity for
motivating scientists and facilitating public discourse.
Contrary to these perspectives, we argue that the key
issue is not whether terminology pertaining to invasive
species can (or should) be objective or standardized in
any absolute sense, but rather whether it can be
clarified and made more objective, and whether this
would improve the science of invasion biology.
We suggest that paths of scientific inquiry come in
different forms, which we will term methodological
and motivational for the purpose of this discussion.
Table 1 demonstrates the difference between meth-
odological and motivational questions using examples
from invasion biology. Though not taken from any
particular study, we think these questions exemplify
common questions explicit or implicit in the current
literature on biological invasions, with obvious par-
allels to other ecological disciplines. Subjectivity and
flexibility associated with methodological questions
(hereafter methodological subjectivity) arise as an
inevitability of the desire for generality in science, but
are constrained because questions are linked to well-
established scientific theories and paradigms. For
example, most ecologists would immediately associ-
ate ‘‘rate of population growth’’ in question #2 (Set A)
with r, the intrinsic rate of growth, which has a long
history in ecology and a solid theoretical basis (e.g.
Richards 1959). The question then becomes: ‘‘what is
the best way to measure r,’’ rather than: ‘‘what is
population growth rate?’’ There is some flexibility in
how one might define the rate of growth for their
Table 1 Two sets of scientific questions, common in invasion
biology, which demonstrate different levels of subjectivity
Set A: Methodological questions
1. What factors determine whether an introduced species
establishes?
2. What affects the rate of population growth in introduced
species and does it differ from natives?
3. Why do some introduced species spread faster than others?
4. How does propagule pressure affect the population genetics
of introduced species?
5. How do native herbivores affect the fitness of introduced
species?
Set B: Motivational questions
6. How important are invasive species relative to other
environmental issues?
7. Which species will have a negative impact?
8. Why should we be concerned about invasive species?
9. Should we allow species X or Y into the country?
10. What is the best way to control invasive species Z?
Questions in Set A may not be strictly objective because
different researchers studying different species in different
habitats will use different criteria to measure self-sustaining or
rate of population growth or spread. However, these
judgements are constrained by ecological and evolutionary
theory, while the subjectivity inherent in terms from Set B, like
environmental issues or impact or concern, are not
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particular taxon or study system, but limiting defini-
tions to those based on well-established ecological
theory improves communication with other scientists,
allows more directed hypothesis testing, and reduces
the potential for bias.
In contrast, motivational subjectivity is poorly
constrained by scientific theory, thereby obscuring
biological process in favour of flexibility to motivate
scientific research and engage the public. For exam-
ple, the term impact from question #7 (Set B) is not
clearly associated with any specific ecological or
evolutionary processes (Williamson 2001), and thus
includes both methodological subjectivity and the
values held by society as a whole (Lodge et al. 2006).
We suggest that this is a crucial motivation for
excluding any connotation of impact in any criteria
for a biological definition of invasive (see Richardson
et al. 2000, 2008; Daehler 2001; Rejmánek et al.
2002; but see Davis and Thompson 2000, 2001 for
counterarguments). When we argue for greater
objectivity in invasion biology, we are (i) advocating
a reduction in motivational subjectivity in scientific
research, without dismissing its importance for public
education as a whole, and (ii) implicitly allowing for
methodological subjectivity—a limited form of flexi-
bility in definition.
Motivational subjectivity can be an important
component of public discourses in science, and this
may be the type of subjectivity Larson (2007) had in
mind when he noted its importance for improving
public understanding of science. For example, the
notion of the ecological and economic impact of an
introduced species incorporates societal values and
therefore might be an enticing criterion for the
definition of an invasive species (see Davis and
Thompson 2001). Incorporating societal values can
be a powerful method for inspiring research pro-
grammes and engaging the public. This explains why
impact has been included as a criterion for invasive
species in public policy issues (e.g. Executive Order
13112 on Invasive Species, February 3, 1999),
despite objections by many ecologists (see Richard-
son et al. 2000, 2008; Daehler 2001; Rejmánek et al.
2002).
Including highly subjective concepts, like impact,
as a criterion in discourse among professional
scientists—in peer-reviewed publications for exam-
ple—only serves to obscure scientific understanding
of the ecological and evolutionary processes
underlying the invasion process. In particular, it has
been shown that the rates of establishment and spread
of an introduced species are not correlated with its
demonstrated impacts, at least partially as a result
of difficulties inherent in quantifying impacts in the
first place (Parker et al. 1999; Ricciardi and Cohen
2007). Because there is no firm basis in ecological
theory, virtually any measure of impact can be used
to call a species invasive, making generalizations
difficult, or even spurious. It should not be surprising
that generalities are absent, and contradictory results
common, in the most active areas of invasion biology
research: characteristics of successful invaders,
enemy release hypothesis, evolution of increased
competitive ability, and habitat susceptibility, for
example. Loose definitions therefore do impede
diffusion of scientific ideas and impede research
efficiency, contrary to Hodges’ (2008) argument. It is
precisely this disconnect of invasive in the ecological
from the public policy senses, and the inconsistent
definition in scientific publications, that motivated
our original attempts to clarify invasion terminology
(Richardson et al. 2000; Colautti and MacIsaac
2004).
Whether one wishes to use the example of
subjectivity vs. objectivity, flexibility vs. clarity, or
motivational vs. methodological, we believe it is
clear that subjectivity of terms in many disciplines of
ecology can and should be reduced when communi-
cating research among biologists. Referring to an
introduced species as invasive because it has an
ecological or economic impact adds a level of
subjectivity that removes invasive from established
ecological and evolutionary theory. Examples of
confused terminology that were reviewed in Rich-
ardson et al. (2000), and the inconsistent inclusion of
impact to define invasive species are therefore more
than ‘‘…a few anecdotes of genuine confusion where
authors conflated dissimilar observations…’’ (Hodges
2008; p. 36).
Despite the importance of clear terms and consis-
tent definitions among researchers, our entire
argument is moot if terminology cannot be clarified.
Hodges (2008; p. 39) identifies three reasons why
attempts to standardize ecological terminology are
likely to fail: (i) everyone must agree on the same
definition, (ii) older publications will remind readers
of previous meanings, and (iii) new meanings will
creep in to all but the most concisely defined terms.
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Although not acknowledged by Hodges (2008), the
C&M framework explicitly addressed these issues by
advocating a set of supplementary terms to clarify
invasion terminology, while still retaining some
flexibility. Because it is grounded in biogeography,
the C&M model and its predecessors eliminate
motivational subjectivity but allow enough method-
ological subjectivity to avoid the problems that
Larson (2007); Hodges (2008) raise.
Our example of motivational and methodological
subjectivity may represent an artificial dichotomy.
Nevertheless, it demonstrates how unrestrained flex-
ibility of definitions and subjectivity of method, such
as the indiscriminate adoption of societal values into
scientific terms and definitions in primary research
articles, is less efficient for the advancement of
scientific theory. The arguments of Larson (2007) and
Hodges (2008) support a research programme in
invasion biology that could be harmful to scientific
understanding because they underestimate the level
of subjectivity already present in many disciplines of
ecology. We wish to stress that we are acutely aware
of the importance of public engagement in the
scientific process (Richardson et al. 2008). Our own
research, and that of many other invasion biologists,
includes the formulation of management strategies
and policy recommendations (e.g. Colautti et al.
2006; Foxcroft et al. 2008; van Wilgen et al. 2008).
Without compromising the need for more objectivity
in invasion biology, these exemplify Larson’s asser-
tion that ‘‘…scientists need to interact with non-
scientists to conduct research that is of value to
society’’ (Larson 2007; p. 952). While we agree that
communication between scientists and the rest of
society is imperative, we caution against the careless
incorporation of motivational subjectivity into the
methods of science, particularly in peer-reviewed
publications (see also Richardson et al. 2008). As
scientists, invasion biologists can best serve society if
we allow motivational subjectivity into public dis-
course but attempt to minimize it in the methods of
scientific inquiry.
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